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CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND NEW
TECHNOLOGIES: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR SOLOVE
Orin S. Kerr*
INTRODUCTION

In an Article in this issue, my friend and colleague Professor Daniel J.
Solove offers an interesting and thoughtful response' to a recent article of
mine, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Casefor Caution ("ConstitutionalMyths"). 2 In that article, I
identified and attempted to explain a growing bifurcation of search and
seizure law. Search and seizure law involving traditional facts and stable
technologies remains predominantly a matter of constitutional law. As
every student of criminal procedure knows, the law emerges in a case-bycase fashion via Fourth Amendment rulings handed down by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Fewer realize that the law governing new and rapidly
changing technologies has become predominantly statutory. Congress has
created what is in effect a parallel Fourth Amendment to regulate many
areas of privacy when technology is in flux.
The question is, why does this bifurcated regime exist? Constitutional
Myths attempted to identify and explain the doctrinal, historical, and
functional underpinnings of this growing reality. The first section
explained why the bifurcated regime has coexisted with current Fourth
Amendment doctrine, and contended that Fourth Amendment rules have
remained surprisingly tied to property law. 3 The second section looked at
the canonical historical example of wiretapping law, and explained that,
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. I wish to thank Daniel
Solove for his friendship and the many interesting discussions we have had about the subject
of this article.
1. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification: A Critique of Professor
Kerr's Casefor JudicialRestraint, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 747 (2005).
2. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths
and the Casefor Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801 (2004) [hereinafter ConstitutionalMyths].
I also wrote a brief reply article to responses from Professors Sherry Colb and Peter Swire,
all of which appeared in the same issue. The response articles are Peter P. Swire, Katz is
Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 Mich. L. Rev. 904 (2004), and Sherry F. Colb, A World Without
Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 889, 890 (2004). My short reply article is Orin S.
Kerr, Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire, 102 Mich. L. Rev.
933 (2004).
3. See Kerr, ConstitutionalMyths, supra note 2, at 808-38.
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contrary to the common wisdom, wiretapping may be constitutional in
theory but remains mostly statutory in fact. 4 The third section considered
the relative institutional competence of Congress and the courts in creating
rules of criminal procedure when technology is in flux. It contended that
Congress's capacity for ex ante rulemaking, expert input, and its freedom
from the case or controversy requirement gives it a considerable
institutional advantage in this context relative to courts. 5 In light of the
institutional competence of legislatures when technology is in flux, I
suggested, the bifurcation of criminal procedure may not be a bad thing.
Indeed, the former may be the cause of the latter.
In his response, Professor Solove agrees with me that "we are witnessing
a codification of the Fourth Amendment ' 6 with respect to changing
technologies. Despite our agreement on the descriptive question, we
diverge on the normative one. While ConstitutionalMyths made the case
that the bifurcated regime may be desirable, counseling judicial caution
when technology is changing, Solove urges courts to assume "a bold role..
. not a cautious one."'7 He is skeptical that institutional competence is
relevant, but claims that, to the extent we accept institutional competence as
a factor in normative policymaking, my article fails to make the case that
Congress is better suited than the courts to generate balanced and clear
protections in this area. 8 According to Solove, courts are just as well suited
to generate rules as is Congress. 9 He further claims that courts can play a
special role by reviewing statutory privacy laws to determine whether they
are sufficiently privacy protective.' 0
In this brief Essay, I hope to defend my claim against Solove's critique.
In my view, Solove's response misses the mark in two ways. First, it
improperly compares statutory rules as they are with Fourth Amendment
rules as Solove wishes them to be. The switch from the descriptive to the
normative stacks the deck in favor of judicial rules, diverting attention from
the more helpful analytical question. Second, I think Professor Solove
under-appreciates the institutional limitations of judicial rulemaking. When
technology is changing rapidly, the framework of judicial rulemaking in the
context of criminal procedure places courts at a significant informational
disadvantage. I conclude by considering Solove's suggestion that courts
should subject statutory privacy regimes to a type of facial challenge under
the Fourth Amendment. The proposal is an interesting one, but it would
force courts to grapple with a long list of quite difficult conceptual
problems. Solove may have a solution to these problems, but we would

4. See id. at 839-56.
5. See id. at 857-86.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Solove, supra note 1, at 747.
See id. at 776.
See id. at 773.
See id.
See id.
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need to work through them more thoroughly before I could be more
optimistic about Solove's proposed solution.
I. NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE CLAIMS
My primary difficulty with Solove's critique is that his institutional
comparison contrasts statutory rules as they are with constitutional rules as
he wishes them to be. The critique compares existing statutory law with a
hypothetical regime in which the courts "applied" the Fourth Amendment.
The catch is that, in Solove's usage, "applying" the Fourth Amendment has
a specific meaning: It means labeling all government action a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure. 11 To Solove, Supreme Court cases declining
to find a reasonable expectation of privacy do not apply the Fourth
Amendment and find it imposes no restrictions on police conduct. Rather,
such cases reflect a "failure to apply the Fourth Amendment."'1 2 In
Solove's critique, "applying the Fourth Amendment" means imposing a
broad warrant requirement. The government must obtain a warrant or fit
within a narrow exception to the warrant requirement at essentially every
step of every investigation.
A reader familiar with Solove's scholarship knows that this legal
framework matches his normative policy preferences. In a recent article,
Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 13 Solove offered what he
termed a "rather radical"'14 proposal for Congress to enact: "Warrants
supported by probable cause should be required [by statute] for most uses
of electronic surveillance."' 15 He explained that "[t]his should be the
general rule, with specific exceptions authorizing access under less strict
standards enumerated in the statute" 16 when the invasion of privacy is de
minimis. 17 "Additionally," he writes, "all violations should be enforced by
an exclusionary rule." 18 Solove justified this approach on a number of
policy grounds. He claimed that a broad warrant rule provides the right
check on executive power, 19 protects against sweeping dragnet
11. See id. at 750 ('Applicability' refers to those particular law enforcement activities
that the Fourth Amendment covers. The Fourth Amendment applies to a law enforcement
activity whenever there is a 'search' or a 'seizure."').
12. Id. at 754 ("Some of the federal statutes were enacted in response to the Court's
failure to apply the Fourth Amendment to particular situations."). Solove repeatedly
describes the holdings of such cases as being "that the Fourth Amendment did not apply" in
those circumstances. Id. at 752-53 (describing the Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979); id 752 (describing the Court's holding in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976); id at 750 (describing the holding of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438

(1928)).
13. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1264 (2004).

14. See id. at 1266.
15. Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
at 1299.
Id.
at 1300.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
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investigations, 20 prevents hindsight bias, 2 1 and imposes a clear and
22
appropriately flexible standard for law enforcement.
Solove's normative proposal has now reemerged, and forms the basis of
his institutional comparison. Solove compares the imperfect statutory law
that exists today with a hypothetical legal framework that he greatly
admires:
The current status quo reveals areas where the courts refused to apply the
Fourth Amendment and where legislatures became involved. I aim to ask,
are we better off with the void as filled by the legislative rules or would
we be better off had the Fourth Amendment been interpreted to
encompass a particular law enforcement activity? I believe in many
23
instances, the latter would be better.
Unsurprisingly, the existing regime of statutory law fails to measure up
to Solove's normative ideal. 24 Existing law contains a number of gaps,
Solove explains; 25 it does not offer enough protection 26 and its remedial
27
schemes are inadequate to protect privacy.
I agree with a number of these criticisms, and, as Solove notes, have
written articles making similar points. 28 But the imperfections of existing
statutory law shed little light on the relative institutional competence of
Congress and the courts. To be sure, a comparison of existing statutory and
constitutional rules at a particular moment in time could shed some light, if
only as a momentary glimpse of the kind of output that statutory versus
constitutional regimes are likely to produce in areas of technological
change. But Solove does not offer such a comparison. While he laments
the withering away of the Fourth Amendment in the first half of his article,
the institutional comparison in the second half is limited to contrasting
existing statutory law with an idealized model of what he believes the
Fourth Amendment should protect. 29
In my view, the more useful comparison is the one I make in
Constitutional Myths: a comparison between the institutional ability of
Congress and the institutional ability of the courts to generate clear and
balanced criminal procedure rules when technology is in rapid flux. The
question is not whether any regime is perfect-no laws are-but whether
courts or Congress are likely to be in a position to generate better rules of
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 1300.
Id.
Id. at 1301.
Solove, supra note 1, at 762 n.124.

24. See id. at 764-66. Solove notes that "[gliven a choice, it seems that a better balance
between privacy interests and law enforcement needs could have been reached if the courts
had held that the Fourth Amendment covered a particular law enforcement activity." Id. at
766.
25. Id. at 763.
26. Id. at 765.
27. See id. at 763.
28. See id. at 767.
29. See id.at 751-53.
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criminal procedure when technology is changing rapidly.
Here, the
advantage lies with Congress. When technology is changing quickly, it is
ideal for the law to change quickly along with it. Congress can legislate
comprehensively, updating rules when technology changes. 30 Congress can
enact much clearer rules, soliciting expert input and acting when the
technology is still current. 3 1 The absence of a case and controversy
requirement allows Congress to set the best rule for current technology; in
contrast, judicial efforts to hit a moving target force the courts to keep the
32
law uncertain to maintain flexibility for future technological change.
I. JUDICIAL INFORMATION DEFICITS
In Constitutional Myths, I contended that the richer information
environment is one of the several advantages of congressional rulemaking
when technology is in flux. Judges generally reach decisions by reading
focused legal briefs and cases, picking a side, and then writing up the case
based on the record and the arguments of the parties. If the court
misunderstands the technology, the court usually will not know that until
after the opinion is released and has become binding law. In contrast,
Congress can reach decisions by seeking expert input, holding hearings, and
receiving responses concerning proposed bills and statutory text. Proposed
bills can be scrutinized, commented on, and debated at length from a wide
range of perspectives before being passed into law. To borrow from
computer software circles, the difference between the two environments is
something like the difference between open-source and closed-source
software. 33 Judges follow a closed-source model, in which they ask for
briefs, hold a short oral argument, and then work in secrecy to produce the
outcome. Legislatures follow an open-source model, in which the language
and procedure is open to the public.
In my earlier article, I argued that these differences give Congress a
considerable advantage when technology is changing:
Judges struggle to understand even the basic facts of such technologies,
and often must rely on the crutch of questionable metaphors to aid their
comprehension. Judges generally will not know whether those metaphors
are accurate, or whether the facts before them are typical or atypical given
the technology of the past or the present. These dynamics make it easy
for judges to misunderstand the context of their decisions and their likely
effect when technology is in flux. Judges who attempt to use the Fourth
Amendment to craft broad regulatory rules covering new technologies run
an unusually high risk of crafting rules based on incorrect assumptions of

30.
31.
32.
33.

See
See
See
See

Kerr, ConstitutionalMyths, supra note 2, at 871-75.
id. at 875-82.
id. at 873-74.
generally Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 Loy. U.

Chi. L.J. 275, 280-85 (2003) (providing background information on open-source and-closed
source software).
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context and technological practice. The context of judicial rulemaking
is
3
unusually conducive to high rates of error when technology is in flux.
Professor Solove disagrees. He claims that "[t]here is no reason

. . .

to

assume that the average legislator can better understand technology than the
average judge. ' 35 To Solove, the question boils down to laziness: New
technologies are not particularly complex, and any judge or legislator can
understand them. My argument in favor of legislative competence is not
that legislators are smarter than judges, however, nor that they work harder.
Rather, the argument is that the institutional environment of legislative
rulemaking will lead to rules that better reflect technology.
To see why, consider the ways in which judges reach decisions in cases
with new and developing technologies. For judges and their law clerks,
learning a technology is mostly a matter of book learning. They read the
parties' briefs, get an idea of some of the technological questions, and then
go on Westlaw or Lexis and hunt around for law review articles that discuss
the relevant technology. If they find something, they must hope that the
information is accurate and still current. It might be, but then it might not
be, and judges and clerks are not well positioned to tell the difference. The
judge will then write up the opinion in the solitary environment of judicial
chambers. The process is solitary and closed.
The legislative process is more open and interactive. Bills are public,
and interest groups can track them and comment on them. The press can
write stories about proposed bills, drawing public attention and scrutiny to
proposed legal rules. Legislative staffers can invite technologists to testify.
They can ask for comment from law enforcement and privacy groups, both
of which have close connections to technology-savvy advisors. They can
float various ideas, and find out which are better and which are worse.
Legislatures can also give special significance to the views of particular
legislators. A district court judge must reach her decision on her own. In
contrast, a large legislative body can allow a few key players to have
unusual influence. For example, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont is
the most informed voice in the Senate on questions of electronic privacy,
and he also tends to be among the most influential. Legislators may
recognize Senator Leahy's expertise and defer to his judgment. Reliance on
a single group decision may lead to better rules than an individual
judgment.
Professor Solove is also unimpressed with the case studies I offer in my
article exploring judicial misunderstandings of developing technology that
led to counterproductive or unclear rules. My article focused on two cases,
United States v. Bach36 and Trulock v. Freeh.37 Solove is unimpressed with
Bach because the errors in that case were recognized by the appellate court,
34. Kerr, ConstitutionalMyths, supra note 2, at 875-76 (footnotes omitted).
35. Id.
36. No. CRIM.01-221, 2001 WL 1690055 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2001), rev'd, 310 F.3d
1063 (8th Cir. 2002).
37. 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
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and the decision was reversed on appeal. 38 Solove suggests that this will
happen in most cases, so the risk of judicial error is low. A few more
examples can help to illustrate that this is not so. The evidence is
anecdotal, of course, but in my view revealing.
One notable case is United States v. Carey,39 in which the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit created a "special approach" to computer
warrants that requires magistrate judges in the Tenth Circuit to approve
specific search protocols for searches of computers. 40 If the warrant does
not explain the specific search protocols, the evidence is suppressed. 4 1 The
"special approach" is based on an assumption, itself drawn from a 1994 law
review article, 42 that it is easy to know ex ante how to minimize the
invasiveness of computer searches. 4 3 Magistrate judges can know the
proper protocol, the thinking goes, so they should require them to minimize
the invasiveness of the searches. As I detail at length in another article, it
turns out that this assumption is false. 44 At least based on current
technologies, the computer search process is highly contingent and
unpredictable, rendering ex ante protocols largely useless if not
counterproductive. Magistrate judges in the Tenth Circuit must include
them, however, even though they do not serve the purpose the Tenth Circuit
intended. Why? Because one panel read a law review article and reached
an incorrect empirical conclusion about the computer forensics process.
Another interesting example is United States v. Maxwell, 45 a decision by
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Maxwell was the first case that
applied the Fourth Amendment to e-mail, and the opinion tried to offer a
careful analysis of the relevant technology and how the Fourth Amendment
should apply to it. The court held that an America Online ("AOL")
subscriber had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his stored e-mail on
AOL's servers. The court's rationale was expressly limited to AOL e-mail,
however, on the ground that AOL e-mail was different from "Internet" email:
AOL differs from other systems, specifically the Interet, in that e-mail
messages are afforded more privacy than similar messages on the Internet,
because they are privately stored for retrieval on AOL's centralized and
46
privately-owned computer bank located in Vienna, Virginia.

38. Solove, supranote 1, at 772.
39. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).

40. See id. at 1275 n.7.
41. See, e.x., United States v. Barbuto, No. 2:00CR197K, 2001 WL 670930 (D. Utah
Apr. 12, 2001) (suppressing evidence due to the absence of a search protocol).
42. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 Harv.
J. L. & Tech. 75 (1994).
43. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275 (citing Winick, supra note 42).
44. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2005).
45. 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
46. Id. at 417 (citations omitted).
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What does this mean? The court seemed to think that AOL is a
"system," and "the Internet" is another "system," justifying treating AOL email differently than Internet e-mail. But in fact no such distinction exists.
AOL e-mail is a type of Internet e-mail, and all Internet e-mail is privately
stored at a "private" computer server somewhere. It seems that the court
simply misunderstood how e-mail works. As a result, the meaning of the
court's opinion is quite difficult to understand. Is e-mail protected by the
Fourth Amendment? Under Maxwell, it depends on whether the e-mail is
"Internet" e-mail or some other kind of e-mail.
A final example is the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Simons.4 7 In Simons, government investigators retrieved computer files
from the computer of a government employee. The files contained child
pornography, leading to criminal prosecution. The defendant appealed his
subsequent conviction on the ground that the investigators had violated the
Fourth Amendment in accessing his files. Here is how the court's opinion
described the relevant facts of the search:
[F]rom his own workstation, rthe investigator] examined [the defendant's]
computer to determine whether rthe defendant] had downloaded any
picture
files from the Internet; [the investigator] found over 1,000 such
48
files.
This description is ambiguous about a key question: What is the
defendant's "computer"? In most modem work environments, an employee
will be assigned a personal computer in his private workspace that is
connected to a central server. The employee will save some files on the
personal computer, and other files on the central server.
Did the
investigator in Simons examine the machine in the defendant's office, or
examine the files stored on the server? We don't know. And it turns out to
be a very important distinction for Fourth Amendment purposes: The
Fourth Amendment rules for computers on a stand-alone personal computer
present a very different set of questions from the Fourth Amendment rules
for information stored on a network. 49 While there are several possible
explanations for this oversight, one very possible one is the court's failure
to understand a basic client-server network.
III. THE TROUBLE WITH FACIAL CHALLENGES
Professor Solove ends his essay
for how the courts should apply the
in flux. If I understand Solove
statutory efforts to regulate privacy

by turning briefly to his own proposal
Fourth Amendment when technology is
correctly, he wants courts to subject
in new technologies to a type of facial

47. 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
48. Id. at 396.
49. For an introduction to some of those issues, see Brief for Professor Orin S. Kerr as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-1238), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/bach/kerr-amicus.pdf.
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challenge. 50 Under his approach, courts should not simply require a
warrant in every instance. Rather, courts should examine Congress's
handiwork and decide "whether Congress's legislation is adequate to satisfy
Fourth Amendment requirements." 5 1 According to Solove, courts should
determine whether the statute minimizes dragnet searches, leads to
particularized searches, and controls the executive branch sufficiently. If
the statute achieves these goals, akin to the kinds of protection that a
warrant requirement should afford, courts should uphold it. If the statute
courts should invalidate parts or all of it and
does not achieve those goals, 52
make the legislature try again.
Unlike Professor Solove, I do not have a specific approach worked out as
to how I think the courts should apply the Fourth Amendment to new
I maintain that caution is quite important as a general
technologies.
principle, for the reasons explored in ConstitutionalMyths. Unfortunately,
I am not certain about the specifics beyond that (at least yet). For now, I
will limit my response to Solove to a narrow point about Fourth
Amendment facial challenges. Whatever their possibilities, such challenges
raise a number of considerable headaches. Perhaps courts may go that
route: The Supreme Court did review a Fourth Amendment statute under a
facial challenge once, in Berger v. New York. 53 But facial challenges of
Fourth Amendment statutes pose a number of complex and formidable
questions. Three of these are general difficulties, and the fourth is specific
to the problem of rules governing new technologies.
One difficulty with Fourth Amendment facial challenges is finding an
appropriate standard to determine how good is "good enough." Solove
wants the courts to measure particularization, control, and minimization,
but offers no standard to use to know when these goals are sufficiently
satisfied. A second and related challenge is knowing how the statute will
work in practice. Solove wants courts to determine whether a statute will
protect the values he identifies as central to the Fourth Amendment. But
courts looking at a statutory scheme generally have no idea how the statute
works in practice. In the case of a new statute, no record will exist of how
the statute is working in the real world. How are courts supposed to know
whether a statutory scheme offers enough protection?
50. The difference between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges is complex
and slippery, and remains a relatively unexplored fault line in constitutional adjudication.
As a general matter, however, an as-applied challenge claims that the government's conduct
as permitted by a statute violated the defendant's rights. The violation is specific to the facts
of the defendant's case, and the statute is flawed only to the extent it permitted the
government to act in that case. In contrast, a facial challenge claims that the defendant was
acted upon pursuant to a statute that itself was constitutionally improper. The harm claimed
is not a direct violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, but rather a more abstract
claim that the defendant was acted upon pursuant to a statute that has some kind of
constitutional defect. See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., As-Applied and FacialChallenges
and Third-PartyStanding, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000).
51. Solove, supra note 1, at 774.
52. Id.
53. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Such problems have led the Supreme Court to strongly disfavor facial
challenges in the Fourth Amendment context. The key case is Sibron v.
New York, 54 decided just a year after Berger. In Sibron, the defendant tried
to bring a facial Fourth Amendment challenge to a New York stop-andidentify statute. In an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court
declined to accept the facial challenge. The Court's analysis focused on the
practical difficulties of conducting a facial review outside of the specific
context of evaluating warrant procedures:
We decline . . . to be drawn into what we view as the abstract and
unproductive exercise of laying the extraordinarily elastic categories of
[the statute] next to the categories of the Fourth Amendment in an effort
to determine whether the two are in some sense compatible. The
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of
question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the
individual case. In this respect it is quite different from the question of
the adequacy of the procedural safeguards written into a statute which
purports to authorize the issuance of search warrants in certain
circumstances. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). No search
required to be made under a warrant is valid if the procedure for the
issuance of the warrant is inadequate to ensure the sort of neutral
contemplation by a magistrate of the grounds for the search and its
proposed scope, which lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. This
Court held last Term in Berger v. New York, supra, that N.Y. Code Crim
Proc. § 813-a, which established a procedure for the issuance of search
warrants to permit electronic eavesdropping, failed to embody the
safeguards demanded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Section 180-a, unlike § 813-a, deals with the substantive validity of
certain types of seizures and searches without warrants. It purports to
authorize police officers to "stop" people, "demand" explanations of them
and "search [them] for dangerous weapon[s]" in certain circumstances
upon "reasonable suspicion" that they are engaged in criminal activity and
that they represent a danger to the policeman. The operative categories of
§ 180-a are not the categories of the Fourth 55
Amendment, and they are
susceptible of a wide variety of interpretations.
Path dependency provides a third problem. Let's assume that we have
found a way to solve the first two problems: We have agreed on a standard
to use to measure how good is good enough, and we know exactly how
each phrase in the statute works in practice. Courts could give the statute a
single up or down vote, upholding or invalidating it en masse. This may be
an inefficient way of going about things, though: If the court strikes down
the law, the legislature would have to try again, and the process could go on
for many years before it enacts a statute that the courts find constitutional.
Alternatively, the courts could uphold parts of the statute and strike down

54. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
55. Id. at 59-60 (citations omitted).
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other parts. But how can they chose which parts of the statute should be
retained or struck down?
Imagine that a statute has ten sections, each of which has a particular
impact on privacy that depends in part on the impact on privacy of the other
sections. The total number of combinations of different sections of the
statute that could be upheld would be expressed mathematically as two to
the tenth power, or 1024 different combinations. Let's imagine a court
concludes that only two percent of the available combinations will lead to a
privacy regime that is sufficiently protective of privacy to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment standard. That two percent translates into twenty different
combinations. Are courts supposed to list all twenty combinations that may
work, and then instruct the legislature to pick which combination it wants?
Or should the Supreme Court just pick the one it likes the best among the
twenty combinations? If the latter, how are the Justices supposed to
decide?
A final reason to be skeptical about facial challenges is specific to
changing technologies. As technology shifts, the implications of different
legal rules change. A rule that is protective today may not be protective
tomorrow, which means that the facial constitutionality of a statute may
change over time. If we accept Professor Solove's approach, a statute may
be facially constitutional one year, unconstitutional the next, and then
constitutional again a year later. Whether a particular law should be upheld
would hinge on the precise timing of when the Supreme Court decided to
hear the case, and no one would know whether a Supreme Court decision
from the past was still binding on legislatures of the present.
Consider the following example. Imagine that the year is 1985, and
Congress rewrites the telephone privacy laws from scratch. Congress
enacts a new law, the Super Privacy Protection Act ("SPPA"), which
creates extremely strong privacy protection for all landline phone
communications. Given the state of technology of the day, however, the
law does not offer any protection for cordless or cellular phone
communications. The Federal Bureau of Investigation can almost never
wiretap landline phones, offering very strong privacy protection. In 1985,
Justice Daniel Solove would vote to uphold the statute. At that time,
cordless and cellular technologies are in their infancy, and the
overwhelming proportion of telephone calls are between two landline
phones. The SPPA would be seen as broad and privacy protective.
Now fast-forward to the year 2005. Cellular phones have taken over;
most people spend as much or more time talking on cell phones than regular
phones, and landline phones seem a bit quaint. By 2005, the SPPA no
The statute now exempts half or more
longer seems so super.
communications from its coverage. Is the SPPA facially constitutional? In
1985, Justice Daniel Solove voted to uphold the statute; by 2005, however,
Solove will have to change his vote. The statute that was facially
constitutional in 1985 will have become facially unconstitutional by 2005,
as the number and popularity of cordless and cellular phones increased. At
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some point between 1985 and 2005, social practices concerning the use of
different types of telephones will have reached the tipping point, rendering
the constitutional unconstitutional. Of course, it could tip back: Perhaps a
company will introduce a new type of landline phone in 2008 that will
become extremely popular, and the SPPA will become constitutional again.
So is the SPPA facially constitutional? It depends on when the question is
asked.
For all of these reasons, tasking the courts with conducting a rigorous
facial review of statutory privacy laws seems quite difficult. It may be
possible, but it is a surprisingly complex task. To the extent Solove's
proposal is based in part on facial review of privacy statutes, I am skeptical
that courts have the capacity to review such statutes in a coherent and
principled way.
CONCLUSION

While Professor Solove and I disagree on the normative question of
institutional competence, I am delighted that he agrees with my basic
descriptive claim. Scholars of criminal procedure tend to think of the field
as a branch of constitutional law. To learn the law, we look to the opinions
of the Supreme Court that interpret the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. In recent years, however, a statutory equivalent to that
regime has begun to emerge. The new law is found more in the United
States Code than the United States Reports. For better or worse, statutory
law has become a very important source of privacy protection in criminal
investigations involving new technologies.

